


STREET — LEVEL BUREAUCRACY

DILEMMAS OF
THE INDIVIDUAL
IN PUBLIC SERVICES
MICHAEL LIPSKY



CHAPTER 2

Street-Level Bureaucrats as Policy Makers

Street-level bureaucrats make policy in two related respects. They exercise wide discretion in decisions about citizens with whom they interact. Then, when taken in concert, their individual actions add up to agency behavior. The task in this chapter is to demonstrate that the position of street-level bureaucrats regularly permits them to make policy with respect to significant aspects of their interactions with citizens. Later chapters will explore the implications of making policy at the street level.

The policy-making roles of street-level bureaucrats are built upon two interrelated facets of their positions: relatively high degrees of discretion and relative autonomy from organizational authority.

Discretion

Unlike lower-level workers in most organizations, street-level bureaucrats have considerable discretion in determining the nature, amount, and quality of benefits and sanctions provided by their agencies.¹ Policemen decide who to arrest and whose behavior to overlook. Judges decide who shall receive a suspended sentence and who shall receive maximum punishment. Teachers decide who will be suspended and who will remain in school, and they make subtle determinations of who is teachable. Perhaps the most highly refined example of street-level bureaucratic discretion comes from the field of cor-

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rections. Prison guards conventionally file injurious reports on inmates whom they judge to be guilty of "silent insolence." Clearly what does or does not constitute a dirty look is a matter of some subjectivity.²

This is not to say that street-level workers are unrestrained by rules, regulations, and directives from above, or by the norms and practices of their occupational group. On the contrary, the major dimensions of public policy—levels of benefits, categories of eligibility, nature of rules, regulations and services—are shaped by policy elites and political and administrative officials. Administrators and occupational and community norms also structure policy choices of street-level bureaucrats. These influences establish the major dimensions of street-level policy and account for the degree of standardization that exists in public programs from place to place as well as in local programs.

To the extent that street-level bureaucrats are professionals, the assertion that they exercise considerable discretion is fairly obvious. Professionals are expected to exercise discretionary judgment in their field. They are regularly deferred to in their specialized areas of work and are relatively free from supervision by superiors or scrutiny by clients.³ Yet even public employees who do not have claims to professional status exercise considerable discretion. Clerks in welfare and public housing agencies, for example, may exercise discretion in determining client access to benefits, even though their discretion is formally circumscribed by rules and relatively close supervision.

Rules may actually be an impediment to supervision. They may be so voluminous and contradictory that they can only be enforced or invoked selectively. In most public welfare departments, regulations are encyclopedic, yet at the same time, they are constantly being changed. With such rules adherence to anything but the most basic and fundamental precepts of eligibility cannot be expected. Police behavior is so highly specified by statutes and regulations that policemen are expected to invoke the law selectively. They could not possibly make arrests for all the infractions they observe during their working day.⁴ (Like doctors and clergymen in many jurisdictions, they are required to be on-duty and ready to intervene even during their off-duty hours.) Similarly, federal civil-rights compliance officers have so many mandated responsibilities in comparison to their resources that they have been free to determine their own priorities.⁵ It would seem that the proliferation of rules and responsibilities is only problematically related to the degree of discretion street-level bureaucrats enjoy.⁶

Although the case for the pervasive existence of discretion in street-level work is fairly easy to make it is important to remember that in public services

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some interactions take place with citizens that involve relatively little bureaucratic discretion. Patrolmen assigned to traffic duty or gun permit applications, for example, may interact with the public but exercise little discretion in performing these tasks. Discretion is a relative concept. It follows that the greater the degree of discretion the more salient this analysis in understanding the character of workers' behavior.

Since many of the problems discussed here would theoretically disappear if workers' discretion were eliminated, one may wonder why discretion remains characteristic of their jobs. The answer is that certain characteristics of the jobs of street-level bureaucrats make it difficult, if not impossible, to severely reduce discretion. They involve complex tasks for which elaboration of rules, guidelines, or instructions cannot circumscribe the alternatives. This may be the case for one of at least two reasons.

First, street-level bureaucrats often work in situations too complicated to reduce to programmatic formats. Policemen cannot carry around instructions on how to intervene with citizens, particularly in potentially hostile encounters. Indeed, they would probably not go out on the street if such instructions were promulgated, or they would refuse to intervene in potentially dangerous situations.⁷ Similarly, contemporary views of education mitigate against detailed instructions to teachers on how and what to teach, since the philosophy prevails that to a point every child requires a response appropriate to the specific learning context.

Second, street-level bureaucrats work in situations that often require responses to the human dimensions of situations. They have discretion because the accepted definitions of their tasks call for sensitive observation and judgment, which are not reducible to programmed formats. It may be that uniform sentencing would reduce inequities in the criminal justice system. But we also want the law to be responsive to the unique circumstances of individual transgressions.⁸ We want teachers to perceive the unique potential of children. In short, to a degree the society seeks not only impartiality from its public agencies but also compassion for special circumstances and flexibility in dealing with them.⁹

A third reason discretion is not likely to be eliminated bears more on the function of lower-level workers who interact with citizens than with the nature of the tasks. Street-level discretion promotes workers' self-regard and encourages clients to believe that workers hold the key to their well-being. For both workers and clients, maintenance of discretion contributes to the legitimacy of the welfare-service state, although street-level bureaucrats by no means establish the boundaries of state intervention.

The search for the correct balance between compassion and flexibility on

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the one hand, and impartiality and rigid rule-application on the other hand presents a dialectic of public service reform. Reformers attempt to limit worker discretion at one time, and increase it at another. In order to make ambulance dispatch by untrained personnel more efficient, health planners work to rationalize emergency dispatch procedures by developing a programmed format to aid in identifying health emergencies.¹⁰ Meanwhile, other health planners seek to replace untrained admission clerks with health professionals in order to insure greater sensitivity to the health problems of prospective patients.¹¹ Programmed learning materials are introduced to release teachers for more intensive work with some students, while all students benefit from these motivational and self-paced features. Later this innovation is found wanting because it eliminated teachers' feedback to students and encouraged regimentation rather than individualized learning.¹² To the extent that tasks remain complex and human intervention is considered necessary for effective service, discretion will remain characteristic of many public service jobs.

Relative Autonomy from Organizational Authority

Most analysts take for granted that the work of lower-level participants will more or less conform to what is expected of them. Organizational theorists recognize that there will always be some slippage between orders and the carrying out of orders, but this slippage is usually attributed to poor communication or workers' residual, and not terribly important, disagreement with organizational goals. In any event, such difficulties are usually considered unimportant enough that organizations can overcome them.

This observation is partly derived from the recognition that lower level workers' behavior in organizations, including public agencies, appears to be cooperative. Workers for the most part accept the legitimacy of the formal structure of authority, and they are not in a position to dissent successfully.

But what if workers do not share the objectives of their superiors? Lower-level participants in organizations often do not share the perspectives and preferences of their superiors and hence in some respects cannot be thought to be working toward stated agency goals. At least this is the case when workers are not recruited with an affinity for the organization's goals; workers do not consider orders from "above" legitimate; or the incentives available to supervisors are matched by countermeasures available to lower-level

participants. One level workers' interests and the incentives available to them must prevail.¹³

Sometimes disapproved as insensitive and unresponsive to workers as having those interests, policy would be an anachronism. Compliance systems for workers' "antagonism" would be an anachronism.

In such organizations of higher level workers, mutual adjustment of interests. In such organizations, suppressed or taken as problems, the mechanism is adjusted.¹⁵

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participants. One can expect a distinct degree of noncompliance if lower-level workers' *interests* differ from the interests of those at higher levels, and the incentives and sanctions available to higher levels are not sufficient to prevail.¹³

Sometimes different levels of organizations are more appropriately conceived as intrinsically in conflict with each other rather than mutually responsive and supportive.¹⁴ At times it is more useful to view lower-level workers as having distinctly different interests and the resources to pursue those interests. Here discrepancies between policy declarations and actual policy would be expected and predictable. And explanations for the discrepancies would be searched for not in the breakdown or inadequacy of the compliance system but in the structure of the work situation from which workers' "antagonistic" interests arise.

In such organizations policy may be carried out consistent with the interests of higher levels, but this should be understood as resulting from the mutual adjustment of antagonistic perspectives as well as the result of shared interests. In such cases the latent conflict in the interests of different levels is suppressed or is a matter of indifference to one or both parties. This approach takes as problematic the mutuality of interests, and it searches instead for the mechanisms by which essentially antagonistic or divergent interests are adjusted.¹⁵

Some of the ways lower-level workers can withhold cooperation within their organizations include such personal strategies as not working (excessive absenteeism, quitting), aggression toward the organization (stealing, cheating, deliberate wasting), and negative attitudes with implications for work (alienation, apathy).¹⁶ Workers may take advantage of collective resources to act noncooperatively by forming trade unions or by exercising rights under collective bargaining agreements or civil service regulations. These collective strategies for noncooperation contribute to workers' willingness to display lack of motivation and to perform at only minimal levels.¹⁷

These forms of noncooperation injure organizations' abilities to achieve their objectives because workers perform at less than full capacity. The management challenge perceived to be at the heart of the problem is how to make workers' needs for personal, material, or psychological gratification mesh with the organization's needs. Thus the management problem regarding worker absenteeism becomes how to improve job satisfaction while retaining productivity.

However, there is another class of conflicts between lower-level workers and the organizations that arise not from the personal needs of the workers alone but also from their positions within their organizations. The role of

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street-level bureaucrats, like other roles, may be conceived as a set of expected interests¹⁸ as well as expected behaviors. Street-level bureaucrats may be shown to have distinctly different interests from the interests of others in the agencies for which they work. Moreover, certain features of their role make it possible for them to make these differences manifest. Differences in interests, and the possibility of surfacing the differences, permit analysis of the structural position of street-level bureaucrats from a conflict perspective.¹⁹

In the following brief discussion, the nature of the conflict between the objectives and orientations of street-level bureaucrats and those in higher authority roles is considered first. Then the capacity of street-level bureaucrats' ability to resist organizational directives is treated.²⁰

Differences between Street-Level Bureaucrats and Managers

In general lower-level workers have different job priorities than managers. At the very least, workers have an interest in minimizing the danger and discomforts of the job and maximizing income and personal gratification. These priorities are of interest to management for the most part only as they relate to productivity and effectiveness. In street-level bureaucracies lower-level workers are likely to have considerably more than minimal differences with management. Earlier it was suggested that worker compliance is affected by the extent to which managers' orders are considered legitimate. Street-level bureaucrats may consider legitimate the right of managers to provide directives, but they may consider their managers' policy objectives illegitimate. Teachers asked to participate in compensatory education programs in which they do not believe, or policemen no longer able to arrest derelicts for alcoholism, may resist these policy objectives in various ways.

One way in which the interests of street-level bureaucrats depart from those of managers is their need to process work loads expeditiously, free from real and psychological threats. The fact that street-level bureaucrats must exercise discretion in processing large amounts of work with inadequate resources means that they must develop shortcuts and simplifications to cope with the press of responsibilities. The coping mechanisms street-level bureaucrats develop (see part III) often are unsanctioned by managers of their agencies.

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Street-level bureaucrats are interested in processing work consistent with their own preferences and only those agency policies so salient as to be backed up by significant sanctions. These sanctions must be limited. If everything receives priority, nothing does. Work-processing devices are part of the informal agency structure that may be necessary to maintain the organization, even though the procedures may be contrary to agency policy.²¹

This is a neat paradox. Lower-level participants develop coping mechanisms contrary to an agency's policy but actually basic to its survival. For example, brutality is contrary to police policy, but a certain degree of looking-the-other-way on the part of supervisors may be considered necessary to persuade officers to risk assault. Street-level bureaucrats have a role interest in securing the requirements of completing the job. Managers, on the other hand, are properly result-oriented. They are concerned with performance, the cost of securing performance, and only those aspects of process that expose them to critical scrutiny.

Another aspect of street-level bureaucrats' role interests is their desire to maintain and expand their autonomy. Managers try to restrict workers' discretion in order to secure certain results, but street-level bureaucrats often regard such efforts as illegitimate and to some degree resist them successfully. Indeed, to the extent that street-level bureaucrats (and this would include police, teachers, social workers, and nurses, as well as doctors and lawyers) expect themselves to make critical discretionary decisions, many of managers' efforts to dictate service norms are regarded as illegitimate. To the extent that this is the case we have uncovered a condition for non-compliance of lower-level workers. This does not mean that efforts to constrain street-level bureaucrats are in fact illegitimate. Street-level bureaucrats have some claims to professional status, but they also have a bureaucratic status that requires compliance with superiors' directives. It does mean, however, that street-level bureaucrats will perceive their interests as separate from managers' interests, and they will seek to secure these interests.²²

Street-level bureaucrats conspicuously create capacities to act with discretion and hang on to discretionary capacities they have enjoyed in the past. The maintenance and enhancement of discretion is so important that some detailed illustrations may be useful.

Lower-court judges have recently encouraged the development of a great many alternatives to incarceration, in essence turning the courts into social work referral services. In Massachusetts and elsewhere lower-court judges can refer presumptive offenders to many social programs, the successful completion of which will result in obviating their sentences. These include

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programs to provide first offenders with counseling, job training, and placement assistance, and alcoholics, reckless drivers, and drug offenders with appropriate counseling. In addition, judges have the services of psychiatrists, social workers, probation officers, and others who might be able to provide treatment as an alternative to imprisonment. These developments have been conceived by humanitarian reformers who believe, along with many judges, that prisons create more criminals than they deter by exposing people to experienced crooks, and by pragmatists, who recognize that the courts have become revolving doors of repeat appearances without deterrent effect.

It is conspicuous to court observers that these programs take a heavy burden off the judge. The judge is now able to make what appears to be a constructive decision rather than simply to choose between the unattractive alternatives of sending a person to jail or releasing the putative offender without penalty. Indirect evidence that these programs fill critical institutional needs is suggested by the Boston pretrial diversion programs. These programs were utilized beyond their capacity by judges, sometimes without regard for the extremely important initial interview or the relatively stringent eligibility requirements the programs sought to impose in order to maximize effectiveness. Dependent upon judges for referrals and, indeed, for their programs' existence, administrators found it difficult to refuse judges who referred too many clients, or inappropriate clients, to them.²³

The Veterans Administration hospital system is a fascinating bureaucracy because it employs doctors, the preeminent professionals, in highly rule-bound organizations. The country's system of socialized medicine for the indigent veteran has developed an extremely complex series of rules because of simultaneous congressional concern to provide veterans with hospital services, maintain strict cost accounting, and (particularly in the past) not compete with private medical practice. In large part because the VA system was to provide hospital care, leaving to private physicians the business of office consultations, the VA hospitals were prohibited from treating patients on an outpatient basis. This conflicted with the doctors' prerogative to prescribe a level of treatment appropriate to the problem presented. There are many patients who need treatment, but not hospitalization, and to hospitalize such people would be to deny others the hospital space.

However, there was an allowable exception to the rule limiting services to hospitalized veterans. Under the "Pre-Bedcare" category (PBC) veterans who required health services prior to their anticipated admission (for example, blood tests prior to surgery) could be treated. Despite various requirements intended to limit PBC treatment to those whose admission was clearly expected, actual admission to the hospitals from PBC lists was

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traditionally very low. It seems that doctors, chafing under the restriction that they could not treat patients according to their best estimate of need, were treating patients as outpatients under the fiction that they were expected to be admitted. This supposition is supported by observing what happened when the VA introduced an Ambulatory Health Care (AHC) policy, permitting outpatient treatment for the first time. PBC admissions plummeted, while AHC admissions rose steadily. In one hospital AHC received 148 patients in the first five months of the program, while PBC dropped from 122 to 73 patients during that period. Fifty-one of these patients transferred directly to the AHC program.²⁴ In retrospect it seems that doctors were able to utilize existing bureaucratic structures to impose their views of proper treatment on the organization, despite organizational efforts to circumscribe their discretion.

Street-level bureaucrats will also use existing regulations and administrative provision to circumvent reforms which limit their discretion. In December 1968, in response to pressure from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Boston Housing Authority (BHA) adopted new tenant-selection guidelines designed to insure housing project racial integration. The plan utilized what was known as the "1-2-3 rule." To eliminate personnel discretion in assignments the 1-2-3 rule provided that prospective tenants would be offered places only in the housing projects with the three highest vacancy ratios. If these offers were refused, the application would be returned to the bottom of the waiting list.

The BHA integration plan did not work. Many housing authority employees objected to assigning people to projects in which they did not want to live. They were particularly concerned for their traditionally favored clientele, the elderly, poor whites who populated the "better" BHA projects. Among the reasons the reform did not work were that housing authority personnel were so inundated with work that proper administrative controls were not feasible, and in the chaos of processing applications, those who wished to favor some prospective tenants over others were able to do so. Housing officials took advantage of provisions for exceptions to the 1-2-3 rule, interpreting reasonable provisions for flexibility in extremely liberal ways when they wanted to. They volunteered information to favored prospective tenants concerning how to have their applications treated as emergencies or other high-priority categories, while routinely processing the applications of others. Applications were frequently lost or misplaced so that workers could favor tenants simply by locating their files and acting on them, while other files remained unavailable for processing. Meanwhile, public housing managers contributed to the sustained biases of the agency by failing to report

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vacancies to the central office when they occurred, not informing prospective tenants when units were available, or showing tenants they wished to discourage only unattractive or unsafe units, although others in the project were available. Thus the press of work combined with workers' desires to continue to serve particular clients restored the discretionary powers the new rules were designed to eliminate.²⁵

The power of street-level bureaucrats to thwart reforms by manipulating legal loopholes is suggested in a strategy paper prepared by New York City officials to reduce welfare rolls. It indicates managerial awareness of the limits of agency reform without worker cooperation. The paper rejects the possibility of shortening intake hours too drastically, in part because of the chance that "welfare workers would go out of the centers and take applications from people at home, on the street, etc., since application may be made [under existing Federal law] at agency office, in own home, by telephone, by mail, or in any suitable place."²⁶

A dramatic example of the instinct to retain discretionary options is provided by the response to the New York State laws sponsored by then Governor Nelson Rockefeller to impose mandatory, severe jail sentences for drug dealers, while providing relatively minor penalties for those caught with small amounts of drugs. The rationale for the law was to provide a strong deterrent to the drug trafficker. Predictably, some people arrested were not the rapacious drug dealers whom the law was designed to deter. This was the case, for example, with drug addicts on methadone who occasionally sold a dosage. The law presented a dilemma for court personnel, who believed that the mandatory, minimum sentence (life imprisonment for the methadone hustlers) was too severe for the offense. In these cases New York District Attorney Richard Kuh began to charge the alleged offenders not with the crimes which they had committed, but rather with crimes for which the punishments were compatible with what he conceived to be the severity of the offense. In this way, the district attorney attempted to provide the discretion demanded by a just court system in the face of legislation designed precisely to eliminate this discretion.²⁷

Still another source of sustained differences in the interests of street-level bureaucrats and managers is their continuous interaction with clients and the varying degrees of complexity in this interaction. Modern bureaucracies gain legitimacy by (often rhetorical) commitments to standards of fairness and equity. But street-level bureaucrats are constantly confronted with the apparent unfairness of treating people alike (just as they recognize the obvious inequities of unequal treatment). Since individuals are so much more than their bureaucratically relevant characteristics—age, sex, place of resi-

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dence, income level, etc.—a failure to recognize these differences sometimes seems unfair in itself. The public housing manager believes that there are degrees of need for public housing not circumscribed by the categories of eligibility. The teacher recognizes that all children deserve her or his attention but thinks some require more attention than others.

Not only are the standards of fairness insufficient to dictate levels of concern, but also street-level bureaucrats, like everyone else, have personal standards of whether or not someone is deserving. The public housing manager may be more sympathetic to the elderly than to other eligibles. Housing inspectors may be sympathetic to the plight of the landlord although nothing in the formal structure of the agency encourages such a bias.²⁸

Under some circumstances it may be appropriate to apply standards of service with respect to personal characteristics. Street-level bureaucrats enjoy considerable discretion in part because society does not want computerized public service and rigid application of standards at the expense of responsiveness to the individual situation. The New York district attorney was praised editorially for contriving to circumvent the mandatory sentencing requirement. The VA doctors were acting on behalf of patients and in opposition to limitations on practice when they assigned pre-bedcare status to patients who did not require hospitalization. Clearly discretion provides opportunity to intervene on behalf of clients as well as to discriminate among them. Yet at best bureaucracies are highly ambivalent about personalistic service delivery. At the least it is an enduring source of conflict between the objectives of managers and workers.

Resources for Resistance

In general, lower-level workers always possess minimal resources with which they can resist managers' orientations or achieve a modicum of response from managers in exchange for compliance. If nothing else, since the costs of recruiting and training a worker are rarely trivial, there is always a degree of noncompliance that can be threatened or realized by workers. If it were otherwise, there would be no problem of management.

Public service workers currently enjoy the benefits of collective resources that strengthen their position considerably. Civil service provisions greatly reduce managers' capacity to manipulate benefits and sanctions to induce performance. Civil service provisions for advancement, introduced origi-

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nally to eliminate biases in promotion, tend to be irrelevant for the skills they purport to test, thus eliminating incentives for meritorious performance. The costs of firing or demoting workers tend to be so great under civil service regulations that managers often prefer to retain workers than to endure a prolonged period of arbitration while the post in dispute remains unfilled, or worse, remains filled by the accused incompetent. This practice results in a mediocre standard of public service performance. Public employee unions in some cases have increased worker protection by building additional safeguards to capricious management decisions into the collective bargaining process.

This does not mean that managers have no control over workers. Formal sanctions, although costly for managers to invoke, are also costly to workers, who thus try to avoid receiving them. Managers also can manipulate discretionary perquisites they control, such as recommendations for advancement or transfer, or shift and work assignments. They also can facilitate or retard individual workers' efforts, granting a day off here, speeding the processing of work there, and generally making a job more or less desirable.

Lower-level workers under some conditions enjoy additional resources stemming from their critical positions in the organization. Sociologist David Mechanic has suggested that under the right circumstances several factors affect the power of lower-level workers. These factors include qualities and characteristics such as expertise, willingness to become interested and to expend effort, and personal attractiveness. They also include structural considerations such as location within the organization, which affects command of information and access and command over organizational tools.²⁹ These resources enhance the power of lower-status workers to the extent that higher-ranked organizational participants become more dependent on them.³⁰ It is the situational characteristics which are of greatest interest to us, since the effectiveness of the personal characteristics depend in large part on the worker's organizational location.

Street-level bureaucrats command a degree of expertise, and indeed, of deference, in some policy areas. (And they more or less display the personal characteristics that enhance their influence.) But it is the discretionary role of street-level bureaucrats and their position as de facto policy makers that critically affect managers' dependence upon their subordinates. The sanctioned discretion they exercise means that to demonstrate their own ability and competence, managers are highly dependent upon subordinates without being able to intervene extensively in the way work is performed.

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minimal work, or by doing work rigidly so as to discredit supervisors. Police officers, for example, can refuse to make vice arrests for a captain they dislike, can refuse to take shortcuts through department regulations in order to achieve results, or can rigidly and comprehensively enforce traffic or parking regulations to the fury of an outraged public and the eventual embarrassment of police officials.³¹ Lower-level participants may also refuse to make decisions that their superiors are formally obliged to make, at some costs to superiors. Doctors who informally delegate dosage decisions to ward attendants,³² or judges who informally allocate sentencing decisions to probation officers, are dependent on their hierarchical subordinates for the smooth functioning of their jobs.

The relationship I have described between street-level bureaucrats and managers has two primary characteristics. First, it is a relationship best conceived in large part as intrinsically conflictual. The role of the street-level bureaucrat is associated with client-processing goals and orientations directed toward maximizing autonomy. Managers' roles in this context are associated with worker-management goals directed toward aggregate achievement of the work unit and orientations directed toward minimizing autonomy. Second, it is a relationship of mutual dependence. Thus managers typically attempt to honor workers' preferences if they are rewarded by reciprocity in job performance. To a degree reciprocity will characterize all working relations; in street-level bureaucracies, however, the resources of lower-level workers are greater than those often possessed by subordinates in other work contexts. Hence, the potential for reciprocity is greater.

This picture of workers and managers in street-level bureaucracies is substantially different from the one usually used to analyze problems of policy making and implementation. Compliance with agency objectives may still be the managerial problem, but it is complicated by the capacity of street-level bureaucrats to resist organizational pressures with their own resources. Some of these resources are common to public service workers generally and some are inherent in their position as policy deliverers with broad discretion.

When relationships between policy deliverers and managers are conflictual and reciprocal, policy implementation analysis must question assumptions that influence flows with authority from higher to lower levels, and that there is an intrinsic shared interest in achieving agency objectives. This situation requires analysis that starts from an understanding of the working conditions and priorities of those who deliver policy and the limits on circumscribing those jobs by recombining conventional sanctions and incentives.