I enjoyed this session’s article, as it challenged our prior assumptions about prazosin and its efficacy in PTSD-related nightmares, and seems to have really made us think about how and why we make our treatment decisions. I’ve also been under the impression that prazosin was the gold standard for PTSD-related nightmares, and I’ve had many patients on it with a variety of responses. (Perhaps prazosin remains the gold standard because we have so few effective ways of treating PTSD-related nightmares. Despite rosy reports of how EMDR and other psychotherapeutic modalities fix PTSD, there are many patients who have minimal improvement even after really intensive treatment. As with prazosin, research doesn’t always reflect what we see in practice.)
It’s interesting to see each of us go through the processes of questioning our knowledge and then either discarding or modifying previous practices or, in some cases, doubling down despite this research. This made me think about how we make our treatment decisions - while we all would like to think we are completely rational, using evidence- and science-based treatment choices, in reality our decision-making processes as providers are subject to a lot of cognitive biases that can lead us astray. Cognitive biases affect our clinical reasoning processes, and can lead to errors in diagnosis and treatment, which in turn lead to poorer outcomes, higher healthcare costs, and decreased patient satisfaction. A systematic review of research on cognitive biases in physicians (Saposnic et al., 2016) identified some of the most common cognitive biases:
- Tolerance to risk or ambiguity - more a personality trait than a bias, lower tolerance to risk or ambiguity is associated with more diagnostic errors
- Overconfidence - a universal tendency to believe we know more than we do. Overconfidence reflects a tendency to act on incomplete information, intuitions, or hunches. Too much faith is placed in opinion instead of carefully gathered evidence.
- Framing effects - how diagnosticians see things may be strongly influenced by the way in which the problem is framed, e.g., physicians’ perceptions of risk to the patient may be strongly influenced by whether the outcome is expressed in terms of the possibility that the patient might die or might live. In terms of diagnosis, physicians should be aware of how patients, nurses, and other physicians frame potential outcomes and contingencies of the clinical problem to them
- Availability bias - the disposition to judge things as being more likely, or frequently occurring, if they readily come to mind. Thus, recent experience with a disease may inflate the likelihood of its being diagnosed. Conversely, if a disease has not been seen for a long time (is less available), it may be underdiagnosed
- Anchoring bias - the tendency to perceptually lock onto salient features in the patient’s initial presentation too early in the diagnostic process, and failing to adjust this initial impression in the light of later information. This may be severely compounded by the confirmation bias
- Confirmation bias - the tendency to look for confirming evidence to support a diagnosis rather than look for disconfirming evidence to refute it, despite the latter often being more persuasive and definitive
- Premature closure - a powerful bias accounting for a high proportion of missed diagnoses. It is the tendency to apply premature closure to the decision-making process, accepting a diagnosis before it has been fully verified. The consequences of the bias are reflected in the maxim: ‘‘When the diagnosis is made, the thinking stops.’’ (definitions of each bias taken from Croskerry, 2003)
Confirmation bias and overconfidence definitely play a role in the way many of us have used prazosin - we’ve just ‘known’ that it was the correct and best treatment for PTSD-related nightmares! And many of us (myself included) seem to be struggling with how to synthesize this contrary finding and integrate it into our practice. Thankfully there are ways we can identify and address our cognitive biases, and be more mindful of when they are likely. Rather than regurgitate the whole Croskerry article, I highly recommend reading over it (it’s only 3 pages long, and very concisely written - it’s a great breakdown!)
References
Croskerry, P. (2003). The importance of cognitive errors in diagnosis and strategies to minimize them. Academic Medicine, 78(8), 775-780. Retrieved from https://insights-ovid-com.ucsf.idm.oclc.org/pubmed?pmid=12915363
Saposnik, G., Redelmeier, D., Ruf, C. C., & Tobler, P. N. (2016). Cognitive biases associated with medical decisions: A systematic review. BMC Medical Informatics & Decision Making, 16, 138. Retrieved from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5093937/